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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce
awarding, inter alia, Respondent the parties' real property,
subject to a lien in favor of Appellant based upon an equitable
adjustment of the financial and property interests of the parties
including, inter alia, consideration of amounts paid into the
Union Pacific Retirement Fund for Appellant's sole benefit.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On October 25, 1979, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
Third District Court Judge, of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
awarded Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce.

In his Findings of Fact,

the judge found that, inter alia, the equities in the parties'
house and lot was Forty Thousand Eight Hundred and Ten Dollars
($40,810.00), and that Plaintiff should be awarded this property
subject to a lien in favor of the Defendant in the amount of
Sixteen Thousand One Hundred Sixty-six Dollars and 45/100,
($16,166.45).

The lien amount represents one-half (1/2) the equity

in the property, less one-half (l/2) of the amount paid into the
Railroad Retirement FUnd by Defendant during the course of the
marriage.

(R. 102)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the Court below did not award
any portion of Defendant/Appellant's retirement benefits to her,
and, rather, properly exercised its discretion with regard to the
issues and facts before it, and its decision should be affirmed,
therefore.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with Appellant's Statement of Facts,
with the following corrections and supplementations:
1)

As to Appellant's reference to the Memorandum

Decision (R. 84-86) on page 2 of his brief, it is submitted that
the quoted paragraph represents a ruling, rather than a finding,
of the court.

(R. 85)

(:

I""

2)

The court more clearly set forth its decision with

regard to Defendant's retirement fund contributions in its
Findings of Fact (R. 100, et. seq.), Conclusions of Law (R. 103
et. seq.), and Decree of Divorce (R. 106, et. seq.).

The

Findings of Fact, in relevant part, provide:
That the parties stipulated in open Court that
the equity in the parties' house and lot is
$40,810.00.
Plaintiff should be awarded, as
her sole and separate property, the parties'
said house and lot, which is located at
12023 South 2240 West, Riverton, Utah, subject to a lien thereon in favor of defendant
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X

in the amount of $16,166.45, which amount represents 1/2 of the equity in the said house
and lot, less 1/2 of the amount paid into the
Union Pacific Retirement Fund by defendant
from July 1, 1965, until April 1, 19780
The Conclusions of Law provide, in relevant part:
That plaintiff is entitled to be awarded the
parties' house and lot located at 12023 South
2240 West, Riverton, Utah, as her sole and
separate property subject to a lien thereon
in favor of defendant in the amount of
$16,166.45, and plaintiff should be ordered
to pay defendant the said $16,166.45, less
1/2 of the cost of sale of said property
when said property is sold, ••• (R. 104-105)
The Decree of Divorce awarded the property, accordingly (R. 108),
decreasing the lien by one-half the amount paid into the fund,
not one-half of any property right with regard thereto or benefit
therefrom.
3)

At no point in the proceedings below did Defendant-

Appellant raise nor does he now claim to have raised the issue
of the lawfulness of considering the retirement fund contributions
as part of the financial and property interests of the parties;
even though he was aware of the issue as a result of a communication from the Railroad Retirement Board (R. 94).

Further,

Appellant does not claim to have objected to the introduction of
evidence with regard to his contributions.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE ISSUE RAISED ON APPEAL WAS NOT RAISED BEFORE THE

COURT BELOW, BUT, RATHER APPELLANT APPROVED OF WHAT HE NOW
CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN ERROR, AND THE APPEAL SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE
DISMISSED.
It is well settled that a legal theory which was not
raised at the trial Court, but is raised for the first time on
appeal, must be disregarded by the Appellate Court.
v. Heiselt

See Upton

118 Utah 573, 223 P.2d 428, 432 (1950).
Nothing in the record indicates that the issue regarding
1:::1

the lawfulness of considering the contributions made under the
Railroad Retirement Act was raised below, either by objection to
the admission of evidence, objection to the Court's ruling, or
any other method.

And, Appellant has not otherwise claimed in

this Court that the issue was raised in the trial Court.
The record clearly indicates that defendant affirmatively participated in the Court's consideration of the issue as
to the amount of the contribution which was made during the course
of the marriage.

(R. 87, 88)

At the time, Appellant knew of

the case and holding upon which he bases his appeal.

(R. 94)

It is submitted, therefore, that defendant is estopped
from claiming on appeal that the Court below erred in even con-

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sidering the contributions in making an equitable division of
property.

As was held by the Utah Supreme Court in Ludlow v.

Colorado Animal By-Products Company 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d 347,
at 354,

(1943)

:
A party who takes a position which either
leads a Court into error or by conduct
approves the error committed by the Court,
cannot later take advantage of such error
in procedure.

Defendant's appeal to this Court must be dismissed,
because the issue was not raised below, and, further, because
defendant is estopped

~rom

claiming that the Court below erred

in its ruling.
II.
BY

THE COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED CONTRIBUTIONS MADE

DEFENDANT TOWARD THE RETIREMENT FUND IN CONSIDERING AN EQUIT-

ABLE ADJUSTMENT OF THE FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY INTERESTS BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.

In Utah, the trial Court in a divorce action has a considerable latitude of discretion in making a disposition of the
property of the parties in a fashion which it deems to be faiF,
equitable and necessary for the protection and welfare of the
parties.

Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977).

It is also

settled that, in questioning the use of this discretion,
[tJhe burden is upon the Appellant to pr9ve
that there was a misunderstanding or mis-
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application of the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error: or that evidence clearly
preponderates against the findings as made: or
a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion.
Hansen v. Hansen 537 P.2d 491, 493 (Utah, 1975).

It has also been

settled by this Court that the trial Court has a responsibility to
provide a just and equitable adjustment of the financial and
property interests so that the parties might reconstruct their
lives on a happy and useful basis.

See Searle v. Searle 522

P.2d 697, at 700 (Utah, 1974), and Baker v. Baker 551P.2d1263,
1265 (Utah, 1976).
Appellant does not contend that the award in question
amounts to a manifest injustice or abuse of discretion.
it is contended by Appellant that the trial Court

11

***

Rather,
imper-

missably 'anticipated' Appellant's payment of benefits by offsetting one-half (1/2) of those benefits against the parties'
equity in the home."

See Appellant's Brief, page 6.

Appellant submits that such an award is contrary to the
ruling of Hisquierdo v. Hisguierdo 439 U.S. 572, 59 L. Ed 2d 1,
99 S. Ct._ _ _ (1979).

In the part of that opinion relevant to

Appellant's contention, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that an award of property, under California's community property
laws, which anticipates the benefits which would be obtained from

-6-
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the Railroad Retirement Fund is prohibited under the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974 (45 USCS Section 231, et. seq.).

See

Hisquierdo, Suprao, 59 L. Ed 2d, at 15.
A review of the record, however, clearly reveals that
the Court did not award an interest in any benefits which may be
derived from defendant's retirement fund.

(See Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, plus Decree of Divorce. R. 105 eto seq.)

o

In fact, there is no indication in the record that the court
considered what value those benefits might have.

The only evidence

before it was as to the amount of contributions during the marital
periodo

(R. 91-92)
Further, there was no indication that the Court decided

that a property interest had vested in the defendant as a result
of his contributions.
Rather, the contributions, alone, were considered by
the Court in equitably dividing the property.

This is to be

distinguished from the facts in Hisguierdo, wherein the California
Court had anticipated benefits as a property right under its
community property law and made its award according to that law.
Hisquierdo, Supra., 59 L. Ed. 2d at 10.
The Utah Court properly, equitably, divided the property
interests.

To consider contributions into a fund from which the

defendant, only, may benefit in the

future~

in the course of
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making a division of the property does not constitute anticipation
of a benefit in such a fashion as would be prevented under the
Federal Statute.

The Utah Court has considered the issue and so

ruled in a case involving a comparable situation where it was
contended that a bond, which was exempt from assignment, legal
process or taxation under Federal law, could not be considered
by the Court when dividing property in a divorce action.
Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211 P.2d 452, 454, (1949).
To consider the contributions to the retirement fund and
divide the amount thereof as a financial interest of the parties
is not the same as anticipating the eventual benefit.
Likewise, a Court could consider amounts invested by
one spouse in an investment which had not yet borne fruit, and
which might possibly never bear fruit.

In such a situation, the

opposing spouse may not be able to share, or may not wish to
share in the possible eventual return, the amount of which would
be the subject of mere conjecture.

In such a case, the Court

might properly award the other spouse one-half of the invested
dollarso
Similarly, if a spouse attended a school to gain a
professional license during the marriage, and then the parties
were divorced, a Court might properly make an award of .one-half
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of the amount of expense incurred in the schooling rather than
forcing the second spouse to share the benefits which may or may
not come in the future to the professional spouse as a result of
the professional practice.
To make such an award in any of these situations would
be to equitably consider the financial interests, but not anticipate the benefits.
It is submitted, therefore, that it was clearly within
the discretion of the trial Court to make the award in question,
based upon the amount of money contributed, in an equitable adjustment of the financial and property interests of the parties.
Further, to do so

is not the same as anticipating benefits which

may come to defendant from the Railroad's Retirement Fund.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that Appellant's appeal to this
Court cannot be considered for the reason that the issue raised
was not raised belowo

Further, Appellant is estopped from

bringing the appeal because he approved of the consideration of
the contributions below and, for the first time, on appeal claims
that said consideration was error.

The appeal should, therefore,

be dismissed.
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Even if the Court considers the issue raised, it should
find that the Court below properly exercised its equitable discretion in considering the contributions to the retirement fund
as a financial interest and using the amount of said contributions
as one basis for the equitable adjustment of the financial and
property interests of the parties so that they may reconstruct
their lives on a happy and useful basis.

It is further submitted

that to so consider the contributions actually made during the
marriage is not the same as anticipating benefits which may come
from the fund as a property right, at law, in a division of
community property.

For these reasons, the trial Court 1 s findings,

conclusion and decree should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
SWANER AND TAYLOR ///·~7-------------_> '· . . ; 'i; .. // /
- -· ·/If
.
By "- _,, .., ,.-~- / //-'. ------- ~--:.--· /
ROBERT M. TAYLOR
Suite 722, Boston Building
Salt Lake City-;/ Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7344
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent, Sylvia Torgerson
/-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Respondent's Brief was hand delivered to the office of
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JoAnn Blackburn, Jerome Mooney & JoAnn Blackburn, 356 South 300

East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this

day of February,

1980.
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